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EFFECTIVE REMEDIES FOR INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE
Jenia Iontcheva Turner*

INTRODUCTION

In a pair of cases decided in 2012, Lafler v. Cooper' and
Missouri v. Frye,2 the Supreme Court clarified an important
principle of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. 3 Criminal defendants,
the Court confirmed, have a right to competent counsel even during
the plea bargaining process. 4 The Court also established that the
injury caused by a violation of this right is not mooted by the
subsequent conviction and sentencing of the defendant at an
otherwise fair trial.5
Lafler involved a defendant charged with attempted murder
whose lawyer erroneously advised him that because he had shot his
victim below the waist, the prosecution would not be able to show

* Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. I thank Albert
Alschuler, Jeffrey Bellin, David Ball, Darryl Brown, Donald Dripps, Andrew
Kim, Justin Marceau, Meghan Ryan, Wadie Said, John Turner, and
participants in the SMU Law Faculty Forum, the 2013 Law and Society
Association Annual Meeting, the 2013 AALS Mid-Year Conference on Criminal
Justice, and the 2013 Southwest Criminal Law Workshop for their helpful
comments. Robert Wilkinson and Neil Stockbridge provided valuable research
assistance. The Article has also benefited from exchanges with federal
prosecutors from the Eastern and Northern Districts of Texas.
1. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
2. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
3. See generally Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1376; Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399.
4. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408-10. Earlier cases had already established a
right to counsel during plea bargaining, but those cases concerned defendants
who had waived trials and pleaded guilty as a result of ineffective assistance.
See generally Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356 (2010); Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52 (1985). In Frye and Lafler, ineffective assistance led defendants to
forego a favorable plea deal and proceed to trial or enter a guilty plea on less
favorable terms. See generally Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1376; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at
1399. By affirming the application of the Sixth Amendment in this context, the
Court offered the "clearest indication to date that the right to effective
assistance extends in a meaningful way to plea bargaining." Michael M. O'Hear,
Bypassing Habeas: The Right to Effective Assistance Requires Earlier Supreme
Court Intervention in Cases of Attorney Incompetence, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 110,
114 (2012).

5. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
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the requisite intent to murder.6 Following the lawyer's advice, the
defendant rejected a plea deal, was convicted at trial, and was given
a sentence over three times as long as the one the prosecution had
offered.7 Concluding that the defendant had been prejudiced by his
lawyer's ineffective assistance, the Supreme Court found a Sixth
Amendment violation and suggested that some form of relief was
appropriate. 8 Lafler and its companion case, Frye, made headlines,
and some commentators celebrated the cases for affirming the
application of the Sixth Amendment to plea bargaining.9
The most significant and surprising part of Lafler, however, was
the Court's holding concerning the remedies. After recognizing that
the right to effective assistance of counsel applies during plea
bargaining, the Court proceeded to hold that lower courts do not
always have to repair the harm caused by ineffective assistance.' 0
Specifically, courts need not provide defendants with the benefit of
the shorter sentence that was foregone as a result of attorney
incompetence." The Supreme Court held that the question whether
to order the shorter sentence, to allow the longer sentence to stand,
or to pick a sentence somewhere in between lays within the
discretion of the lower court.12 It offered little guidance to judges
concerning how they should exercise this discretion. Instead, it
suggested that in determining the remedy, trial courts "must weigh
various factors," which would be determined over time through case
law and legislation.13

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 1383.
Id.
Id. at 1388.
E.g., Stephanos Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, 122 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 35, 35 (2012). One commentator called Lafler and Frye the "single
greatest revolution in the criminal justice process since Gideon v. Wainwright
provided indigents the right to counsel." Adam Liptak, Justices Expand Rights
of Accused in Plea Bargains, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2012, at Al (quoting Prof.
Wesley Oliver), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/us/supreme
-court-says-defendants-have-right-to-good-lawyers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
Others have taken a more restrained view of the novelty of the cases. See
Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering
Wound, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 673, 678-81 (2013).
10. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388-89.
11.

Id.

12. Id. at 1389.
13. The opinion stated that "the boundaries of proper discretion need not be
defined here. Principles elaborated over time in decisions of state and federal
courts, and in statutes and rules, will serve to give more complete guidance as
to the factors that should bear upon the exercise of the judge's discretion." Id.
The Court mentioned only two specific factors for judges to consider: the
"defendant's earlier expressed willingness, or unwillingness, to accept
responsibility for his or her actions" and "information concerning the crime that
was discovered after the plea offer was made." Id. The Court also suggested
that "the time continuum makes it difficult to restore the defendant and the
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The dissent called this approach to remedies "absurd,"
"unheard-of," and "incoheren[t]."14 Justice Scalia argued that the
Constitution demands an effective remedy for every violation of a
The majority's flexibility on remedies
constitutional right. 15
neglected this cardinal principle, according to Justice Scalia, and
was

the

result

of

"squeamishness . . . attributable

to

[the]

realization, deep down, that there is no real constitutional violation
here anyway." 16
This Article argues that the dissent's ultimate position
concerning remedies is correct, though not for the reasons it offered.
The majority defended its decision using the principle of balancing:
The defendant's right to a remedy must be balanced against
competing public interests, such as the efficient administration of
justice.17 The majority did not provide a clear justification for this
approach.18 In response, the dissent implicitly attacked balancing
and appeared to reject the notion that a constitutional violation
could be identified but not fully redressed.' 9 This Article maintains
that both approaches are to some extent misplaced.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that balancing
has a place in constitutional criminal procedure. The balancing
approach has, for example, sharply curtailed the range of remedies
provided for violations of the Fourth Amendment. 20 Yet the
legitimacy of balancing in the Fourth Amendment context does not
fully transfer to the Sixth Amendment context. The reason for this
lies in the different interests protected by the two amendments.
The Court has concluded that the primary purpose of excluding
evidence in Fourth Amendment cases is to discourage future
invasions of privacy. 21 When a court suppresses evidence, it does so

prosecution to the precise positions they occupied prior to the rejection of the
plea offer, but that baseline can be consulted in finding a remedy .... " Id.
14. Id. at 1392, 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. See id. at 1397.
16. Id. at 1398. In a separate dissent, Justice Alito noted that the
majority's holding on remedies was "opaque." Id. at 1398 (Alito, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 1388-89 (majority opinion).
18. The Court simply cited to its earlier decision, United States v. Morrison,
but as I argue later in the paper, the Court's reliance on Morrison to support a
Id. at 1388 (quoting United States v.
balancing approach is misplaced.
Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981)). For a discussion of Morrison, see infra
notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
19. Id. at 1392, 1396-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. Indeed, the Lafler dissenting Justices have themselves endorsed such a
balancing approach to the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427
(2011); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009); Hudson v. Michigan,
547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).
21. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
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not to repair the injury to the individual defendant but rather to
deter police misconduct.
By excluding the evidence, the court
protects the privacy and property rights of the larger communityincluding the interests of citizens not guilty of criminal conduct. 22
Where the expected deterrence benefit is minimal but excluding
evidence is too costly-because it may allow guilty defendants to
walk free-courts refuse to order exclusion. 23 As a result, many
criminal defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated
do not effectively enjoy a remedy for the constitutional violation. 24
In this context, where the remedy is targeted to protect the rights of
others, the case for a balancing of competing social interests is more
compelling.
The Sixth Amendment demands a different approach.
Remedies for Sixth Amendment violations are intended to repair the
harm suffered by the accused, not to deter government misconduct
more generally. 25 When a defendant receives a trial whose fairness
was compromised by ineffective assistance, courts order a new
trial.2 6 When a defendant receives a sentence that was harsher
because of counsel's failure to provide competent representation,
courts order resentencing. 27 And when a defendant loses the
opportunity to appeal a conviction because of ineffective assistance,
courts restore that opportunity to appeal. 28 In short, when the right
to effective assistance of counsel has been compromised, courts have
aimed to erase the effects of the constitutional violation and to
return the defendant to the position he would have occupied but for
the ineffective assistance.
Courts have not limited remedies
provided to defendants on the basis of competing social interests.
The same approach should apply to remedies for ineffective
assistance of counsel during plea bargaining. Courts should aim to
restore the defendant as fully as possible to the position he occupied
22. See, e.g., Herring, 555 U.S. at 141; Leon, 468 U.S. at 906; Calandra,414
U.S. at 348. In earlier Supreme Court decisions, another justification of the
exclusionary rule was to preserve judicial integrity and make a statement about
the importance of holding government agents accountable for violations of the
law. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
23. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-09.
24. Sometimes, there is no remedy even on paper. See Herring,555 U.S. at
156 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A
Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 510-11 (2009).

25. One exception to this principle is the Court's approach to the
exclusionary rule for Sixth Amendment violations caused by certain police
interrogation tactics. See Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 591-92 (2009).
26. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986); Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 704 (1984); Profitt v. Waldron, 831 F.2d 1245,
1250 (5th Cir. 1987); Hyman v. Aiken, 824 F.2d 1405, 1412-18 (4th Cir. 1987).

27. See, e.g., Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001); Strickland,
466 U.S. at 704; United States v. Kissick, 69 F.3d 1048, 1056 (10th Cir. 1995).
28. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000).
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before being prejudiced by his counsel's incompetence or neglect. If
a defendant can show that but for counsel's mistake, he would have
received a more favorable sentence under a plea bargain, then
reviewing courts should reduce the defendant's sentence to match
that under the foregone bargain.2 9 Intervening facts should affect
the remedy for ineffective assistance only when these facts have
arisen independently of the ineffective assistance. Application of a
more discretionary balancing approach, such as that suggested by
the Lafler majority, 30 is inconsistent with much of the rest of Sixth
It also represents a mistaken
Amendment jurisprudence.
application of reasoning more appropriate for Fourth Amendment
cases where community interests weigh more heavily.
In advancing the argument for more robust and bright-line
remedies for ineffective assistance during plea bargaining, this
Article reviews lower court decisions that have addressed Laflertype claims during the year following the decision. These decisions
suggest that lower courts summarily dismiss meritless claims of
ineffective assistance and that the vast majority of Lafler claims do
not reach the remedial stage. Among those that do, however, at
least some courts appear to be engaging in the type of balancing
analysis the Lafler majority discussed (though so far, most have
determined that the defendant should receive the full measure of
benefits that were foregone as a result of the ineffective assistance).
The confusion among lower courts concerning the nature of the
balancing analysis suggests the need for greater clarity.
The Supreme Court may have recognized the need to revisit its
holding on remedies in Lafler and will hear a case on remedies for
ineffective assistance in plea bargaining in the fall of 2013.31 The
most desirable outcome would be for the Court to acknowledge that
an ad hoc balancing approach to remedies is ill-suited to this area of
The Court should read the
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
remedial holding of Lafler narrowly and adopt an approach that
generally aims to restore the defendant to the position he would
have occupied but for the constitutional violation. The Court should
allow intervening circumstances to limit the remedy in only one
instance-when these circumstances have emerged independently of
counsel's ineffectiveness.

29. This is the remedy imposed most frequently by lower courts before

Lafler. See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
30. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388-89 (2012).
31. Titlow v. Burt, 680 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W.
3465 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2013) (No. 12-414). The Court may not reach the question
about remedies, however, if it chooses to resolve the case on the grounds that
the Sixth Circuit misapplied the AEDPA review standards or that it
misinterpreted the prejudice standard under Lafler. See id.
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Should the Court fail to modify its balancing approach, lower
courts should use their discretion under Lafler to fully enforce the
Sixth Amendment promise that every accused is entitled to effective
representation in a criminal case. When a defendant receives
incompetent representation and this violation prejudices the
outcome of his case, the only meaningful response is to attempt to
undo the prejudice. Anything less would undermine the right to
effective counsel and would carve out an unnecessary exception to
the longstanding principle of American constitutional law that
where there is a right, there must be a remedy. 32
I. LAFLER's BALANCING APPROACH TO REMEDIES FOR INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE

Anthony Cooper, the defendant in Lafler, rejected a favorable
plea offer and went to trial because of the erroneous advice of his
counsel. 3 3 Cooper was charged by the state of Michigan with assault
with intent to murder and three other counts. 34 In exchange for
Cooper's guilty plea, the prosecutor offered to dismiss two of the
counts and recommend a sentence of fifty-one to eighty-five
months. 3 5 In an unusual step for a criminal defendant, Cooper
wrote to the court admitting guilt and expressing willingness to
accept the plea offer. 36 But Cooper's attorney later convinced him
that the evidence was insufficient to establish his intent to murder
because Cooper had shot the victim below the waist. 37 Based on this
advice, Cooper rejected the plea offer and went to trial. 38 He was
convicted on all counts and received a mandatory minimum
sentence of 185 to 360 months' imprisonment. 39 In a postconviction
hearing, Cooper claimed that his attorney's incompetent advice had
led him to reject the prosecution's plea offer and ultimately to

32. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).

33. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1376.
34. Id. at 1383.
35. Id.

36. Id.
37. At the evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance, the attorney
testified that he had told Cooper that the assault with intent to commit murder
charge "could not be supported by the evidence." Cooper v. Lafler, 376 F. App'x
563, 571 (6th Cir. 2010). Cooper testified that his attorney told him that a jury
"couldn't find [him] guilty of the charge [of assault with intent to commit
murder] because the woman was shot below the waist." Id. (alterations in
original). The trial court concluded that this assertion was contrary to settled
Michigan law and constituted deficient performance. Id. On briefing to the
Supreme Court, the parties agreed that the lawyer had provided deficient
performance, so the Court did not explore the issue further. Lafler, 132 S. Ct.
at 1384.
38. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.
39. Id.
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receive a sentence three-and-a-half times harsher than the one
initially offered by the prosecution. 40 State courts rejected the
claim, but on federal habeas review, both the district court and the
Sixth Circuit granted Cooper's claim of ineffective assistance. 4 1
The Supreme Court confirmed that defendants are entitled to
effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining. 42 If a
defendant foregoes a favorable plea bargain and goes to trial as a
result of his counsel's inaccurate advice, he may be entitled to some
relief under the Sixth Amendment. 43 A fair trial does not wipe away
the constitutional injury resulting from ineffective assistance during
plea negotiations. 44 The defendant continues to suffer the prejudice
of a longer sentence resulting from counsel's deficient performance.
As the Court confirmed, even a day of additional jail time that
results from inadequate representation can be constitutionally
significant. 45
While affirming the application of the right to counsel during
plea bargaining, the Court equivocated when it came to the remedy.
It held that the remedy should be flexible and should balance
competing social interests, including the interest in the efficient
administration of justice. 46 The Court rejected the argument that
the defendant should be put back in the "precise position[] [he]
occupied prior to" the violation of his right to counsel. 47 Pointing to
the possibility of changed circumstances, the Court left trial courts
with broad discretion in fashioning a remedy.
More concretely, it advised trial judges to take one of three very
different steps, depending on the facts of the case: (1) impose "the
term of imprisonment the government offered in the plea," (2)
impose the sentence the defendant received after trial, or (3) impose
"something in between." 48 Where resentencing is inappropriate (for
example, because a mandatory minimum confines the judge's
sentencing discretion), the trial court should order the prosecution
to reoffer the plea proposal. 49 Once the defendant accepts the
renewed offer, the trial court could again exercise its discretion and

40. Id.
41. Id. at 1383-84.
42. Id. at 1387.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1388. This reflects a broad reading of the right to counsel, which
"sees counsel not merely as a protection of 'the fundamental right to a fair trial,'
but as a 'medium' between the defendant and the power of the state." Cecelia
Klingele, Vindicating the Right to Counsel, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 87, 88 (2012).
45. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386 (quoting Glover v. United States, 531 U.S.
198, 203 (2001)).
46. Id. at 1388-89.
47. Id. at 1389.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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either: (1) vacate the convictions and resentence the defendant
pursuant to the plea deal, (2) vacate only some of the convictions
and resentence accordingly, or (3) leave the convictions and sentence
undisturbed.so Trial courts thus have three starkly different
options, including the option of leaving the conviction and sentence
undisturbed.51
Lafler's approach to remedies for ineffective assistance of
counsel broke with previous Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. In
earlier cases on ineffective assistance, the Court instructed courts to
tailor the remedy to the underlying injury. 52 Lower courts did so by
imposing remedies that attempted to restore the defendant to the
position he would have occupied but for the ineffective assistance. 53
In cases where the defendant proved that ineffective assistance
undermined the fairness or reliability of trial, courts ordered a new
trial.54 Where ineffective assistance undermined confidence in the
outcome of a sentencing proceeding, courts ordered resentencing.5 5
Where counsel's mistake rendered a guilty plea uninformed or
involuntary, courts vacated the conviction.5 6 Likewise, where a
defendant failed to appeal because of ineffective assistance, courts
restored the opportunity to appeal.5 7
In cases of ineffective assistance during plea bargaining that
arose before Lafler, lower courts similarly attempted to follow the
rule that the defendant be placed as closely as possible to the
position he would have occupied but for the ineffective assistance.
They either ordered a new trial or resentenced the defendant

50. See id.
51. In deciding among these, courts must consult the foregone plea bargain
as a baseline but then weigh various factors, including the defendant's
willingness to accept responsibility, information about the crime that was
discovered after the plea offer, and other factors to be developed through case
law and legislation. Id.
52. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981).
53. E.g., Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1468-69 (9th Cir. 1994); Becton v. Hun, 516
S.E.2d 762, 768 (W. Va. 1999); State v. Lentowski, 569 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1997); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
54. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986); Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 704 (1984); Profitt v. Waldron, 831 F.2d 1245,
1250 (5th Cir. 1987); Hyman v. Aiken, 824 F.2d 1405, 1412-18 (4th Cir. 1987).
55. See, e.g., Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001); Strickland,
466 U.S. at 704; United States v. Kissick, 69 F.3d 1048, 1056 (10th Cir. 1995).
56. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1985); United States v.
Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 256 (4th Cir. 2012).
57. See, e.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000); Solis v. United
States, 252 F.3d 289, 294 (3d Cir. 2001) ("A new opportunity to directly appeal
is the remedy for petitioner's alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.").
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pursuant to the foregone plea bargain.5 8 The passage of time meant
that these measures were not always able to restore the defendant
to the precise position he occupied before the constitutional
violation. Courts occasionally considered facts aggravating the
defendant's culpability and benefits foregone by the prosecution as a
Still, courts aimed to
result of the ineffective assistance.5 9
approximate the status quo ante as best they could. They did not
balance the defendant's right to a remedy against competing social
interests.6 0
The Supreme Court never fully acknowledged its departure
from these precedents in Lafler. It cited only United States v.
Morrison,6 1 a case in which the Court referred to "competing
interests" in a very different context. 62 In Morrison, government
agents met with a represented defendant without first informing her
attorney. During their meeting, they tried to convince the defendant
to cooperate with them and disparaged the competence of her
attorney. 63 Morrison refused to cooperate and notified her counsel
She later moved to dismiss the
about the agents' behavior.
indictment with prejudice, claiming that the agents had interfered
with her right to counsel. 64 She did not, however, allege that the
interference had prejudiced the quality or effectiveness of her
lawyer's representation in any way.6 5
In determining whether Morrison was entitled to relief, the
Court emphasized that remedies for right to counsel violations
should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests, such as
society's interest in the administration of criminal justice. 6 6 The
Court accordingly held that, in order to obtain dismissal of the
indictment, Morrison had to prove that the agents' actions had in
fact prejudiced her defense.6 7
The Morrison Court referred to competing interests to establish
a prejudice requirement for Sixth Amendment claims that demand
drastic remedies, such as dismissal with prejudice. Morrison can
hardly be read to endorse a broadly applicable, ad hoc balancing

58. See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text; see also David A. Perez,
Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Plea
Bargaining,120 YALE L.J. 1532, 1551-60 (2011). A minority of courts refused
to grant relief, but on grounds now repudiated by Lafler. See, e.g., State v.
Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185, 1187-88 (Utah 2007).
59. E.g., United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 40 (3d Cir. 1992).
60. See infra footnotes 179-82 and accompanying text.
61. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
62. Id. at 364.
63. Id. at 361.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 363.
66. Id. at 364.
67. Id. at 365.
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approach to remedies. In fact, lower courts before Lafler typically
read the case as requiring courts to fashion robust remedies that
restore the defendant to the position he would have occupied absent
the violation of his right to counsel. 68 These courts focused not so
much on the language referring to "competing interests" but instead
on the language urging courts to "identify and then neutralize the
taint [of the constitutional violation] by tailoring relief appropriate
in the circumstances to assure the defendant the effective assistance
of counsel and a fair trial."69
In Lafler, however, the Supreme Court used Morrison to restrict
remedies for Sixth Amendment violations. Even after a defendant
shows prejudice and makes a valid claim of ineffective assistance,
under Lafler, courts still have to examine competing interests to
ensure that the remedy does "not grant a windfall to the defendant
or needlessly squander the considerable resources the State properly
invested in the criminal prosecution."7 0 Remarkably, in some
cases-such as when new aggravating facts emerge during trialthe balancing of interests may result in no remedy for a defendant
who has shown prejudice from a violation of his right to counsel.
Lafler's broad balancing approach provoked a sharp rebuke
from Justice Scalia in dissent, who argued that "the remedy the
Court announces-namely, whatever the state trial court in its
discretion prescribes, down to and including no remedy at all-is
unheard-of and quite absurd for a violation of a constitutional
right."7 1 As the next Part elaborates, while Justice Scalia's point
may be overstated, his ultimate position is correct. Balancing may
be appropriate in some constitutional contexts, but it is
inappropriate in right to counsel cases.
II. THE CASE AGAINST BALANCING
A. The Close Fit Between Right and Remedy in Sixth Amendment
Cases
Justice Marshall's famous pronouncement that "where there is
a legal right, there is also a legal remedy" is a celebrated principle of
constitutional law. 7 2
In reality, however, courts in various

68. E.g., Williams v. Jones, 571 F.3d 1086, 1093 (10th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Carmichael, 216 F.3d 224, 227 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v.
Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1468-69 (9th Cir. 1994); Etheridge v. United States,
Nos. 04-21090-Civ-Seitz, 01-653-Cr-Seitz, 2010 WL 5904472, at *3 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 19, 2010); Leatherman v. Palmer, 583 F. Supp. 2d 849, 871 (W.D. Mich.
2008); Ferrara v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 2d 108, 112 (D. Mass. 2005).
69. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365.
70. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388-89 (2012).
71. Id. at 1392 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
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constitutional cases curtail remedies to account for a variety of
competing social goals, including finality, efficiency, and truth
seeking. 73 In Fourth Amendment cases, for example, the Supreme
Court has recently scaled back the application of the exclusionary
rule to account for such goals. 74 The Court has held that exclusion
is an appropriate remedy only when benefits of deterring official
misconduct outweigh the costs that exclusion imposes on society.75
As this Part argues, however, the rationales that justify balancing in
the Fourth Amendment context do not apply in right to counsel
cases.
When the Supreme Court first held the exclusionary rule
applicable to state criminal proceedings, it underscored the
importance of providing a robust remedy for violations of the Fourth
Amendment. Without a remedy as effective as exclusion, the Court
declared in Mapp v. Ohio, the underlying right "would be 'a form of
words,' valueless and undeserving of mention."7 6 For the Court to
recognize a constitutional right but then fail to fashion an adequate
remedy would be "to grant the right but in reality to withhold its
privilege and enjoyment."7 7
Despite the Court's strong support for the exclusionary rule in
Mapp, the rule remained controversial. Just thirteen years after
Mapp, the Court retreated from its insistence on a full remedy for
every breach of the Fourth Amendment and endorsed a balancing
approach to the exclusionary rule. In United States v. Calandra,the
Court held that "the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved."7 8 From this conception of the rule followed a broad
balancing test that the Court continues to use today. When the

73. E.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, NonRetroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1778-87
(1991); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in ConstitutionalLaw, 109
YALE L.J. 87, 87-88 (1999).
74. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 24, at 500-01; William C. Heffernan,
The Fourth Amendment ExclusionaryRule as a ConstitutionalRemedy, 88 GEO.
L.J. 799, 823-27 (2000); Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of
the Supreme Court's Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009).
75. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
76. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
77. Id. at 656.
78. See 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 906 (1984). The Court arguably embraced balancing even earlier, in
Linkletter v. Walker, where it held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule did not apply retroactively. 381 U.S. 618, 637-40 (1965).
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deterrence benefits are outweighed by the costs to the
administration of justice, exclusion is not warranted.7 9
In Calandra and subsequent cases, the Court offered several
justifications for balancing in Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
cases. First, the Court explained that the exclusionary rule does not
aim to enforce the personal right of the criminal defendant bringing
the claim.8 0 Instead, the rule aims to vindicate a broader public
interest in ensuring that agents of the government comply with the
mandate of the Fourth Amendment.8 1 In other words, the purpose
of the exclusionary rule is not to make the victim of the search and
seizure whole but rather to "safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effects." 82
The Court also suggested that the exclusionary rule cannot fully
redress the injury to the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights-the
government's invasion of these rights "is fully accomplished by the
original search without probable cause." 83 Excluding the evidence at
trial cannot restore the privacy or property rights violated as a
result of the unlawful search or seizure. The rule therefore operates
prospectively, through its general deterrent effect, rather than
retroactively. Unlike traditional legal remedies, the rule does not
and cannot return the defendant to the position he would have
occupied in the absence of the constitutional violation.
More recently, the Court has also justified balancing in the
exclusionary rule context by pointing to the existence of adequate
In Hudson v. Michigan,84 the majority
remedial alternatives.
emphasized the ability of criminal defendants to file lawsuits
against states under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and against the federal
government under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents.8 5 These civil actions, the majority concluded, provide

79. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08 (discussing the "substantial social costs
exacted by the exclusionary rule," including the risk that it "would impede
unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury. . . . that some guilty
defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences," and that this may
"generat[e] disrespect for the law and administration of justice"); Calandra,414
U.S. at 351-52 ("We ... decline to embrace a view that would achieve a
speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police
misconduct at the expense of substantially impeding the role of the grand
jury.").
80. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (citing Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)).
81. Id. at 374 (noting that "the protection it affords against governmental
intrusion into one's home and affairs pertains to all citizens").
82. Stone, 428 U.S. at 486 (quoting Calandra,414 U.S. at 348).

83. Calandra,414 U.S. at 354; accord Leon, 468 U.S. at 906.
84. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
85. Id. at 597 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971)).
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sufficient deterrence of police misconduct in many circumstances,
thus undercutting the need to exclude reliable evidence from trial. 86
While these justifications for balancing might be appropriate in
the Fourth Amendment context, they do not apply to remedies for
right to counsel violations.
Remedies for Sixth Amendment
violations aim principally to vindicate a defendant's "personal right"
to be represented adequately and only secondarily to deter
wrongdoing by state agents.8 7 The Supreme Court drew this precise
distinction in Kimmelman v. Morrison.8 8 In an earlier case, Stone v.
Powell, the Court held that federal habeas relief was unavailable for
Fourth Amendment claims that had been fully and fairly litigated at
the state level. 89 But in Kimmelman, the Court emphasized the
difference between remedies for Fourth Amendment and Sixth
Amendment violations and declined to extend the habeas
restrictions to ineffective assistance claims:
[W]e reasoned in Stone that the exclusionary rule does not
exist to remedy any wrong committed against the defendant,
but rather to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment by law
enforcement
stand on a

personnel . . ..
Ineffective-assistance claims
different footing . . . . [T]he right to effective

assistance of counsel is personal to the defendant, and is
explicitly tied to the defendant's right to a fundamentally fair
trial-a trial in which the determination of guilt or innocence
is "just" and "reliable.". . . A criminal defendant who obtains
relief under Strickland does not receive a windfall; on the

86. Id. at 597-99. But see Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 156
(2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that restricting the exclusionary rule
in the case leaves the petitioner with no remedy, as civil damages would be
unavailable under § 1983); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 610-11 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (contesting the ability of civil actions to deter the police
misconduct at issue); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that only a "fraction of Fourth Amendment violations held to
have resulted in unlawful arrests is ever noted and redressed"). The irony is
that the Court has scaled back the availability of damages for Fourth
Amendment violations while justifying a restriction of the exclusionary rule on
the grounds that damages are available as an alternative remedy. See, e.g.,
Pamela S. Karlan, Shoe-Horning, Shell Games, and Enforcing Constitutional
Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 78 UMKC L. REV. 875, 882-88 (2010);
Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in DoctrinalBorrowing and
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REv. 670, 719-21 (2011).
87. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986) ("In contrast to the
habeas petitioner in Stone, who sought merely to avail himself of the
exclusionary rule, Morrison seeks direct federal habeas protection of his
personal right to effective assistance of counsel.") (emphasis added); cf. U.S.
CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.").
88. 477 U.S. at 377.
89.

428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
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contrary, reversal of such a defendant's conviction is necessary
to ensure a fair and just result.9 0
Unlike a defendant who claims a Fourth Amendment violation,
a defendant who claims a violation of the right to counsel is not
simply a vehicle for deterring official misconduct.9 1 He is therefore
not receiving a "windfall" in an effort to protect the rights of others.
Instead, a traditional Sixth Amendment remedy-retrial or
resentencing-restores the defendant to the place he would have
occupied in the absence of the constitutional violation. It ensures
that the defendant receives what is promised by the Sixth
Amendment-adequate representation and a fair trial. For this
reason, the Supreme Court has treated the right to counsel "as a
procedural guarantee to which an ad hoc balancing of interests is
inappropriate." 92
This highlights another difference between Sixth Amendment
remedies and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Exclusion
of unlawfully obtained evidence does not and cannot directly repair
the injury to the privacy or property of the accused. The violation is
complete by the time suppression of the evidence is requested.
Exclusion will not wipe away the effects of the unlawful search. It
would not help to send officers back to "redo" the search, this time
lawfully. By contrast, remedies for a violation of the right to counsel
can typically repair more directly the harm that the accused has
suffered.
If a defendant is wrongfully convicted or unjustly
sentenced as a result of counsel's deficient performance, the court
can order a new trial or resentencing, thus returning the defendant
as closely as possible to the position he occupied before the violation.
In short, the fit between the remedy and the harm suffered is much
closer in Sixth Amendment than in Fourth Amendment cases.
Another important way in which remedies for Sixth and Fourth
Amendment violations differ is that, in the Sixth Amendment
context, alternative remedies are less likely to be available. As
explained earlier, when the Court has denied a remedy for unlawful
searches and seizures, it has sometimes justified denial in part by
noting that the defendant can file a civil suit to pursue damages for
the violation of his rights. 93 By contrast, in Sixth Amendment cases,

90. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 392-93 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
91. An exception to this principle concerns the exclusion of evidence as a
remedy for certain police interrogation tactics that violate the Sixth
Amendment. See, e.g., Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 591 (2009); Michigan v.
Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350-53 (1990).

92. Bruce Andrew Green, Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (1980) (citing Johnson v.

Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938)).
93. E.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006).
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effective relief on appeal or on habeas remains necessary to
vindicate the right to counsel. As the following paragraphs explain,
other remedies are both practically unavailable and less able to
redress the prejudice suffered by the defendant.
The most obvious alternative remedy-a malpractice suit
against the defense attorney-is not a feasible option in most cases.
To succeed in a malpractice action against an incompetent attorney,
the defendant must typically show that he is actually innocent. 94
This improperly narrows the scope of relief under the Sixth
Amendment to innocent defendants. The Court has repeatedly held,
and affirmed most recently in Lafler, that the right to counsel
extends to guilty and innocent alike.95 Indeed, defendants making a
Lafler-type claim concede their guilt and challenge only their
sentences. They could never meet the actual innocence standard.9 6
Criminal defendants also find it virtually impossible to meet the
strict causation standard for malpractice claims. Instead of merely
proving "reasonable probability" that ineffective assistance
prejudiced the outcome of the case-a standard which is notoriously
difficult to meet-the claimant must show that his attorney was
negligent and that the negligence proximately caused him harm. 97
Unsurprisingly, malpractice suits alleging ineffective assistance
rarely succeed.
More fundamentally, monetary compensation does not offer the
most adequate redress for the constitutional injury at issue. When a

94. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Zelen, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 785, 785 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008) ("In a legal malpractice case arising out of a criminal proceeding,
California, like most jurisdictions, also requires proof of actual innocence.");
Rodriguez v. Nielsen, 609 N.W.2d 368, 374-75 (Neb. 2000). Only a few states
allow individuals to bring a malpractice suit without showing actual innocence.
Schwehm v. Jones, 872 So. 2d 1140, 1146-47 & n.7 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Marrero
v. Feintuch, 11 A.3d 891, 898 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011); Thorp v. Strigari,
800 N.E.2d 392, 395 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). See generally Kevin Bennardo, A

Defense Bar: The "Proof of Innocence" Requirement in Criminal Malpractice
Claims, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341, 342 & n.3 (2007).
95. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012); Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at
380.
96. E.g., Justin F. Marceau, Remedying Pretrial Ineffective Assistance, 45
TEX. TECH L. REV. 277, 301-04 (2012).
97. Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 2003); Brewer v. Hagemann,
771 A.2d 1030, 1033 (Me. 2001). Another possible avenue for relief-a lawsuit
under section 1983-is also unavailable to defendants who have received
ineffective assistance. Marceau, supra note 96, at 296. The Supreme Court has
held that criminal defendants cannot use section 1983 to challenge the
lawfulness of incarceration unless the conviction has already been overturned.
Id. (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)). Even if that
principle is reinterpreted to allow lawsuits claiming ineffective assistance, the
defense attorney's mistakes cannot be attributed to the state for purposes of
establishing state action under section 1983. Id. at 298 (citing Polk Cnty. v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19, 321, 325-26 (1981)).
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defendant suffers ineffective assistance, he is deprived of a central
element of a fair proceeding. While retrial or resentencing can
return the defendant very nearly to the position he would have
occupied but for the constitutional violation, monetary compensation
cannot. For all these reasons, if the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is not to be reduced to a "form of words," then habeas relief
must remain available to convicted persons who received ineffective
representation.
B.

The Feasibilityof Full Remedies for Ineffective Assistance

Even if one accepts that traditional remedies for right-tocounsel violations-retrial, resentencing, and the like-fittingly
repair the constitutional injury to the defendant, there may still be
reasons to favor balancing in the context of ineffective assistance
during plea bargaining.
Some might argue that practical
considerations warrant a more flexible approach. This appears to be
the Court's justification for balancing in Lafler. The Lafler majority
made two related points: (1) that a full remedy may unduly interfere
with important competing public interests and (2) that the passage
of time may make it impossible to craft a workable remedy.98 This
Part responds to the first point, and Part IV addresses the second.
Lafler maintains that courts should use the balancing approach
to ensure that remedies do not "needlessly squander the
considerable resources the State properly invested in the criminal
prosecution." 9 9 The Court then identifies the costs that a remedy
may entail: "The reversal of a conviction entails substantial social
costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the
defendants to expend further time, energy, and other resources to
repeat a trial that has already once taken place; victims may be
These are
asked to relive their disturbing experiences."10 0
significant costs, but as this Part explains, they do not accompany
the remedies contemplated by Lafler.
When a remedy imposes exorbitant costs on the criminal justice
system, it is better avoided. In practice, courts faced with costly
remedies are likely to take measures to dodge them. They may use
prudential doctrines to limit who can present a claim, or they may
narrow the scope of the underlying right to reduce the number of
successful claims.O1 In other words, demanding that courts impose
costly remedies may backfire.
98. 132 S. Ct. at 1388-89.

99. Id.
100. Id. at 1389 (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986)).
101. E.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and
Remedies-and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633,
635-36 (2006); Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal
Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2005 (1998); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights
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For several reasons, this concern does not apply to the most
logical remedy for a Lafler violation-giving the defendant the
benefit of the foregone bargain. 102 Put simply, this means either: (1)
resentencing by the court to match the sentence pursuant to the lost
plea deal or (2) where a mandatory minimum prevents the court
from matching the sentence, vacating the conviction, ordering the
prosecution to reoffer the original deal, and resentencing
accordingly. When compared to other commonly used remedies in
constitutional criminal procedure-retrial, exclusion of evidence, or
dismissal of the indictment-resentencing
appears quite
economical. 103 The costs that Lafler itself cited when discussing the
need for balancing-forcing jurors, victims, witnesses, courts,
prosecutors, and defendants to expend further time and resourcesare all associated with a new trial, not resentencing.10 4 By
comparison, asking the court to impose a largely predetermined
sentence at a hearing where only the parties have to be present
appears workable, predictable, and inexpensive.
This approach is feasible for another reason as well-valid
claims of ineffective assistance are not likely to arise very frequently
in practice. The vast majority of criminal cases result in guilty
pleas, not in trials.10 5 And the incentives of defense attorneys
typically point in the direction of encouraging clients to accept plea
bargains. 0 6 Defense attorneys are more likely to lean on clients too
forcefully to take an offer from the prosecution than they are to

Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 889-99

(1999); Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking "Effective Remedies'" Remedial Deterrencein
InternationalCourts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 720-24 (2008).
102. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Alito, J., dissenting).
103. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 1069, 1097 (2009).

104. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388-89 (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475
U.S. 66, 72 (1986)). Indeed, the costs associated with resentencing must also be
balanced against the cost of continued incarceration in violation of a
constitutional right. See Andrew Chongseh Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making
Criminal Judgements Less Final Can Further the "Interest of Finality," 2013
UTAH L. REV. passim (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2235812.
105. HINDELANG CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF ALBANY
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS tbl. 5.22.2009 (Kathleen Maguire
ed., 2009), available at http://www.albany.edulsourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf
(showing that 97% percent of federal convictions result from guilty pleas)
[hereinafter CriminalDefendants Disposed of in U.S. District Courts]; id. at tbl.
5.46.2006, http://www.albany.edulsourcebook/pdflt5462006.pdf (showing that
94% of state convictions result from guilty pleas).
106. E.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea
Bargaining,84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1205-06 (1975).
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forget to relay a plea offer. 107 True Lafler violations are likely to
remain rare.108
Another concern voiced by some who favor Lafler's remedial
approach is that recognizing a right to effective assistance of counsel
during plea bargaining is likely to invite frivolous filings.1 09 Plea
bargaining remains a highly informal process where few of the
communications between the parties, and between the attorney and
client, are reduced to writing. Counsel's mistakes during plea
bargaining are therefore not likely to be on the record and could
easily be invented by defendants. 1 0 Some commentators have even
worried that defendants may collude with their attorneys to exploit
Lafler and Frye. In this scenario, defendants and their attorneys
would agree to pursue the chance of acquittal of trial and, if that
fails, argue that the defendant received ineffective assistance in
rejecting a plea offer and should be given the benefits of the foregone
plea bargain."1

107. Id. at 1180; Stephanos Bibas, Plea BargainingOutside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2476-81 (2004) (noting the incentives of
overworked defense attorneys to resolve cases through plea bargains rather
than trials); see also Josh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning
by Losing, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 126, 126 (2012) (arguing that Lafler and Frye
will exacerbate this problem).
108. Even when violations do occur, defendants will often be released from
prison by the time an ineffective assistance claim succeeds, so only those
serving long sentences would typically have an incentive to pursue such claims.
E.g., Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650,
2673 (2013).

109. See Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial
Reforms, 126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 162 (2012) ("Appellate and habeas courts are
understandably skeptical of the flood of post hoc, self-serving claims raised by
defendants who were convicted at trial and regret their decisions not to plead.").
110. See Green, supra note 92, at 1069-70. But cf. Roberts, supra note 108,
at 2672 (pointing out that "[i]nvestigations, witness interviews, and other
pretrial events" are likewise not on the record, but courts routinely examine
ineffectiveness claims in those contexts by relying on the "testimony of counsel
and defendant").

111. Graham C. Polando, Being Honest About Chance: Mitigating Lafler v.
Cooper's Costs, 3 HLRE: OFF THE RECORD 61, 64 (2013). But see Darryl K.

Brown, Lafler's Remedial Uncertainty:Why ProsecutorsCan Rest Easy, 4 HLRE:
OFF THE RECORD 9, 11-13 (2013) (describing this scenario, but rejecting it as
unrealistic). As Brown points out, such collusion would be a risky gamble. Id.
at 11. If the client is convicted at trial, he would be imprisoned for years while
waiting for appellate and post-conviction review. Id. at 12. He would then have

to surmount the demanding Strickland and collateral review standards
(discussed later in this Part) to succeed on the merits of an ineffective
assistance claim. If the court concludes that the claim merits an evidentiary
hearing, the defense attorney would have to provide a statement why and how
he rendered ineffective assistance. It is difficult to imagine that lawyers would
violate their ethical obligations and deceive the court in order to pursue a very
unlikely possibility of obtaining a better sentence for a client. Id. at 12-13.
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The possibility that Lafler would invite frivolous claims
appears to be minimal, however. Courts have already developed
several mechanisms to prevent or summarily reject unfounded
claims. On the preventive side, prosecutors have begun making
more plea offers in writing, and some have been placing them on the
record with the court.112 This practice is more difficult to implement
in state courts, where the volume of cases is higher and plea
bargaining is quicker and more informal. But even some state
jurisdictions have begun requiring prosecutors to put offers in
writing, suggesting that preventive steps can be taken at the state
level as well.113 Finally, at pretrial hearings, judges themselves
could inquire into any outstanding plea offers and ensure that the
defendant is aware of the offers and their legal consequences.114
Apart from these preventive measures to reduce frivolous
claims, courts already have at their disposal another effective tool to
deal with meritless claims-the Strickland test for ineffective
assistance. In Strickland v. Washington,115 the Supreme Court
established a dual standard that governs ineffective assistance
claims.116 A defendant must demonstrate both that his attorney's
performance was deficient under prevailing professional norms and
that the deficient performance prejudiced his case.117

112. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408-09 (2012); see also Kates v.
United States, 930 F. Supp. 189, 190 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (suggesting the
introduction of a "pre-colloquy colloquy," at which the government informs the
defendant of any offers made and of the legal consequences of such offers); Ray
v. United States, No. 3.06-cr-8-1, 2013 WL 64971 (N.D.W. Va. Jan. 3, 2013)
(dismissing petitioner's Lafler claim because prosecutor had discussed the
potential penalties at a pretrial conference and this contradicted petitioner's
claim that he was unaware of the possibility of a life sentence upon conviction
at trial).
113. Compare Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409 (discussing state rules that require
plea offers in writing or on the record), with Polando, supra note 111, at 66
(arguing that "reducing all plea offers to writing . . . is impracticable").
114. Although some jurisdictions have interpreted such questions to cross
the line into impermissible judicial participation in the plea negotiations, most
do not favor such a strict interpretation. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial
Participationin Plea Negotiations:A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199,
202-03 nn.6-9 (2006) (discussing state and federal provisions on judicial
participation in plea negotiations). Susan Klein has suggested that federal and
state judges amend criminal procedure rules to require a conference between
the judge and the parties before the entry of a guilty plea. Susan Klein,
Monitoring the Plea BargainingProcess, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 559, 565-66 (2013). At
the conference, the judge would inquire, inter alia, whether the government has
made a plea offer, what the general substance of the offer is, and what the
expected sentencing consequences are, both with and without the proposed plea
agreement. Id.
115. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
116. Id. at 690-92.
117. Id.
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To establish the first element, the defendant must show that his
lawyer's representation fell significantly below professional
norms. 118
Strickland held that courts should defer to the
professional judgment of attorneys and that "counsel is strongly
presumed to have rendered adequate assistance."1 19 Strategic
errors, insufficient zeal, and even certain mistaken legal advice do
not constitute deficient performance. 120
The prejudice requirement is equally strict, and it was
specifically designed to help courts easily dispose of frivolous and
abusive claims. It also helps ensure that a defendant does not
receive an undeserved remedy for a violation that has not directly
harmed his interests. The prejudice requirement helps address the
Court's concern about accommodating competing interests. 121
To prove prejudice under Strickland, the defendant must show
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's failure, the outcome of
the proceeding would have been different.122 This is essentially the
reverse of the harmless error analysis used on appeal, under which
courts presume that the violation influenced the proceeding and
require the government to prove-beyond a reasonable doubt-that
the error was harmless.123 Under Strickland, the defendant bears
the burden of demonstrating that the outcome would have been
different-a hypothetical question that is difficult to answer.12 4

118. See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) ("The
question is whether an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence
under 'prevailing professional norms,' not whether it deviated from best
practices or most common custom." (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690));

Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance
After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2169-70 (2013).
119. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
120. See id. at 690-91; see also Bethel v. United States, 458 F.3d 711, 717
(7th Cir. 2006) (holding that mere miscalculation or erroneous sentence
estimation by defense counsel is not constitutionally deficient performance);

United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1570 (10th Cir. 1993) (same). But cf.
United States v. Martinez, 169 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing laea v.
Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1986)) (holding that "some [sentence]
predictions are such gross mischaracterizations" that they constitute deficient
performance). See generally Bibas, supra note 109, at 161; Bruce A. Green, The
Right to Plea Bargain with Competent Counsel After Cooper and Frye: Is the
Supreme Court Making the Ordinary Criminal Process 'Too Long, Too
Expensive, and Unpredictable.. . in Pursuitof Perfect Justice?,"51 DUQ. L. REV.
735, 756 (2013).

121. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1981).
122. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Reasonable probability requires less than
preponderance of the evidence. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06
(2000).
123.

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); David Cole, Gideon v.

Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington: Broken Promises, in CRn\GNAL
PROCEDURE STORIES 101, 113 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).

124. Cole, supra note 123.
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In practice, it has proven virtually impossible to meet the
Strickland standard. A study of two jurisdictions found that only
about 5% of cases raising ineffective assistance claims had
succeeded.1 25 In one notable case demonstrating the stringent
prejudice inquiry, the court found that the defendant was not
prejudiced by his attorney's nap during the defendant's crossexamination because counsel was awake and effective for the
remainder of the proceedings. 126
Lafler and Frye likewise set a high prejudice bar. A defendant
must show not simply the reasonable probability of a less severe
outcome, but in addition, a reasonable probability that: (1) the
defendant would have accepted the plea offer, (2) the prosecution
would not have rescinded the offer, and (3) the court would have
The inquiry adds these
accepted the plea agreement.127
requirements out of concern that plea bargaining is less transparent
and more likely to invite frivolous claims of ineffective assistance.
As with the prejudice standard under Strickland, defendants
under Frye and Lafler have to muster proof on hypothetical
questions. In proving the first element of the prejudice test-that
they would have pleaded guilty-defendants would have difficulty
providing evidence other than their own affidavit. In Lafler, the
defendant had written to the court expressing a willingness to
accept the plea offer, but this was a highly unusual circumstance.12 8
Most defendants would not have expressed their views about a plea
offer in writing, much less on the record, particularly if they were
not even aware that the prosecution had made such an offer.
In light of statistics that over 95% of convicted defendants do
plead guilty,129 the defendant's own statement ought to be enough to
establish reasonable probability that he would have taken a plea
offer but for the ineffective assistance. Some lower courts have in
Others have
fact found the defendant's affidavit sufficient. 3 0

125. Id. at 117 (pointing to studies of ineffective assistance claims in
California Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit).
126. Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 625-26 (6th Cir. 2011).
127. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012). In oral argument,
Justice Breyer explicitly suggested that courts adopt a heightened prejudice
standard for Frye and Lafler-type claims, "something more than a reasonable
probability that this would have led to the plea." Transcript of Oral Argument
at 16, Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (No. 10-444), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/10-444.pdf.
128. 132 S. Ct. at 1383.

129.

Criminal Defendants Disposed of in U.S. District Courts, supra note

105.
130. E.g., Smith v. United States, 348 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding
that it is not required that "a defendant must support his own assertion that he
would have accepted the offer with additional objective evidence" (quoting
Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 737 (6th Cir. 2003))); Etheridge v. United
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insisted on additional, objective evidence to support a prejudice
finding, and the Supreme Court will weigh in on this question next
term. 13 1 Even among courts that rely on objective evidence to
evaluate the credibility of the defendant's statements, most accept
circumstantial evidence. A number of courts have inferred prejudice
from the sentence differential between the foregone plea sentence
and the post-trial sentence and presumed that the defendant would
have taken the plea offer where that differential was significant
enough. 132 Likewise, courts have been more likely to find prejudice
when the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming and the
defendant had no viable defenses. 133
Defendants may also have difficulty establishing the likely
conduct of the prosecution and the court under the second and third
prong of the prejudice inquiry, particularly in cases where new
circumstances have intervened since the offer was made. 134
Prosecutors have vast discretion in choosing to extend or rescind
plea offers, and judges do likewise, in accepting or rejecting plea
bargains. If courts require objective evidence that a particular judge
would have accepted a particular deal, the defendant may have
difficulty providing such evidence. Judges are unlikely to have
made a statement about the plea agreement because they likely did
not know about it; even if they did, they might be prohibited by local
rules from expressing opinions about specific plea agreements. 135
Still, as the Frye majority explained, lawyers and judges should
have a good sense of prevailing plea bargaining practices in a

States, Nos. 04-21090-Civ-Seitz, 01-653-Cr-Seitz, 2010 WL 5904472, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 19, 2010).
131. Specifically, the Supreme Court will address the question whether the
defendant's testimony, standing alone, would be sufficient to meet the first part
of the prejudice test. Burt v. Titlow, 680 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted,
81 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2013) (No. 12-414). For courts that require
objective evidence, see, for example, Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1068 (7th
Cir. 1991) and Berry v. United States, 884 F. Supp. 2d 453, 463 (E.D. Va. 2012).
132. E.g., Raysor v. United States, 647 F.3d 491, 496 (2d Cir. 2011); Smith,
348 F.3d at 552; Sirota v. State, 95 So. 3d 313, 319-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2012).
133. E.g., United States v. Simpson, No. 2:04CV746-MHT-VPM, 2006 WL
6365520, at *11 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 2, 2006); People v. Phillips, C067261, 2012 WL
3089359, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2012).
134. E.g., Bibas, supra note 109.
135. See Turner, supra note 114, at 199-201. In states like Connecticut,
where judicial participation in plea negotiations is common, such statements
are more likely. See Ebron v. Comm'r of Corr., 53 A.3d 983, 994 (Conn. 2012)
("[W]hen there is evidence that a particular judge had indicated that he would
have conditionally accepted the plea agreement, such evidence is probative of
the question of what a reasonable court would have done.").
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particular jurisdiction. 13 6 This general showing should suffice to
evaluate prejudice as long as no circumstances have intervened
before the acceptance of the plea agreement. If the prosecution
alleges that intervening circumstances would have derailed the deal,
however, it would be much more challenging for the defendant to
show otherwise. 137
In addition to proving prejudice, defendants convicted in state
court must surmount an additional obstacle when raising a Lafler
claim on federal habeas-the standards governing collateral review
of state convictions and sentences. 13 8 With respect to legal issues, a
state prisoner's petition for federal habeas relief can be granted only
if the state court's adjudication was "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."139 On
factual issues, the writ can issue if the state court's findings were
"based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 140 The Supreme

136. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410 (2012); see also Albert W.
Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining,Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
1059, 1064 (1976) (noting that judges tend to accept over 90% of proposed plea
agreements). Of course, some judges are known for being less likely to accept
sentence recommendations by the government under a plea agreement, and in
those courts, it would be more difficult to show prejudice. See, e.g., United
States v. Virgen, Nos. 4:12-CV-73I-A, 4:09-CR-003-A, 2013 WL 490920, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2013) ("Given the undersigned's hesitation at imposing a
sentence of 360 months [after trial], the court would not have accepted a plea
agreement giving movant a sentence of less than 120 months. Accordingly,
movant cannot establish prejudice.").
137. O'Hear, supra note 4, at 117. For a broader discussion of the difficulties
meeting the prejudice standard in this context, see Carissa Byrne Hessick,
Proving Prejudice for Ineffective Assistance Claims After Frye, 25 FED. SENT'G
REP. 147 (2012).
138. See, e.g., Quintana v. Chandler, No. 08 C 05629, 2012 WL 3151260, at
*3, *10 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2012) (holding that the state court was not
unreasonable in concluding that the petitioner failed to prove a reasonable
probability that he would have taken the plea deal). The habeas review
standard is critical because ineffective assistance of counsel claims typically
arise on collateral review rather than direct appeal; the record is rarely
sufficiently developed for the claims to be adjudicated on direct appeal. See,
e.g., United States v. Lampazianie, 251 F.3d 519, 527 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[A] claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be reviewed on direct appeal when ...
it was not raised in the district court, because there has been no opportunity to
develop record evidence on the merits of the claim."); see generally Eve Brensike
Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 679 (2007) (describing
the problem and arguing that "[i]n limited circumstances, appellate attorneys
should be able to open trial records in order to develop ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claims").
139. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).
140. Id. § 2254(d)(2).
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Court emphasized these standards when it recently held that
prisoners must show that "there is no possibility fair-minded jurists
could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this
Court's precedents." 14 1 Numerous procedural hurdles may also
prevent state prisoners from obtaining federal habeas relief.142
These procedural and substantive obstacles are so formidable that,
even when a prisoner has a legitimate claim that counsel provided
ineffective assistance and a federal court recognizes that the claim is
legitimate, relief may nonetheless be unavailable on habeas. 143
The multistep prejudice test, particularly when combined with
strict collateral review standards, makes it exceedingly difficult for
many prisoners to succeed on Lafler claims. 144 A review of cases
raising claims for ineffective assistance in Lafler-type cases (on both
direct appeal and habeas) during the year after Lafler was decided
shows that the vast majority of claims are dismissed. Courts
resolved 174 Lafler-type claims on the merits, but only 14 of these
reached the remedy stage, yielding a success rate of 8.3%.145

141. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). This fall, the Court
will hear a case raising the same issue in the context of Lafler claims, and it
may affirm these strict collateral review standards. Burt v. Titlow, 680 F.3d
577 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2013) (No. 12414).
142. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Is FairnessIrrelevant? The Evisceration of
Federal Habeas Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to
Protect Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1997) (discussing,
inter alia, the statute of limitations, strict rules of procedural default, and the
restrictive retroactivity doctrine); Justin Marceau, Challenging the Habeas
Process Rather Than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 117-24 (2012)
(discussing the limited availability of evidentiary hearings and discovery).
143. Marceau, supra note 142, at 113.
144. See, e.g., Quintana v. Chandler, No. 08 C 05629, 2012 WL 3151260, at
*10 (holding that state court was not unreasonable in concluding that petitioner
failed to prove a reasonable probability that he would have taken the plea deal).
See generally Nancy J. King, Non-Capital Habeas Cases After Appellate Review:
An EmpiricalAnalysis, 24 FED. SENT'G REP. 308, 317 (2012) (finding that after
the AEDPA was passed, the "effective relief rate" on federal habeas review of
state convictions came down from 1% to 0.64%); O'Hear, supra note 4, at 115
(observing that "§ 2254(d)(1) and Strickland have synergistic effects; considered
together, the relevant legal standards raise a nearly insurmountable barrier to
relief').
145. To calculate the success rate, I examined all state and federal cases
that cited to Lafler v. Cooper, were published between March 21, 2012 and
March 20, 2013, and were available on Westlaw. The total count includes only
those Lafler claims that were resolved at least in part on the merits. It does not
include petitions dismissed on procedural grounds or petitions that cite to
Lafler but do not raise an actual Lafler claim. Moreover, it includes not only
cases involving federal habeas review of state convictions, but also cases that
were resolved on direct appeal, in state post-conviction proceedings, and on
federal habeas review of federal convictions. This helps explain the much
higher success rate than that reported by King, supra note 144. Finally, it is
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Notably, of the fourteen cases that reached the remedy stage, only
two involved state prisoners petitioning for federal habeas relief. 146
Most of the successful Lafler claims were resolved on direct appeal,
upon a motion for a new trial, or during state post-conviction
proceedings-not on federal habeas.147
In short, Frye and Lafler will not open the floodgates to
ineffective assistance claims. Defense attorneys will rarely err on
the side of recommending trial instead of a guilty plea, and few will
fail to relay offers to their clients, especially once prosecutors and
judges take steps to prevent this. The demanding Strickland and
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA")
standards will weed out frivolous claims. And when defendants
rightfully succeed on the merits, the costs of the remedyresentencing-will be relatively low, requiring no new trials and
letting no guilty defendants walk free. Effective remedies in Laflertype cases are therefore feasible and not likely to produce windfalls
for undeserving defendants. The next Part explains why this is so,
even when new, aggravating facts emerge before the court
determines the remedy for ineffective assistance.
III. A RESTORATIVE APPROACH TO REMEDIES AFTER LAFLER
If courts are to reject the balancing approach to remedies in
Lafler-type cases, it is important to develop an alternative that is
fair and workable. This will be most challenging in two situations:
(1) cases where, with the passage of time, facts aggravating the
defendant's liability have emerged; and (2) cases where the
prosecution is no longer able to derive benefits it expected from the
bargain. In both of these situations, courts might be reluctant to
give the defendant the sentence expected under the foregone
bargain. This Part analyzes the extent to which intervening
circumstances might be relevant to the remedy and offers principles
that should guide courts in their analysis.
important to note that the relief rate in Lafler-type cases may in fact be
somewhat higher than 8.3%. The total number I used does not include twentyone decisions that were remanded for an evidentiary hearing and were not
resolved as of June 21, 2013. If all of these remands were to result in a victory
for the defendant, the success rate could theoretically climb up to as high as
21%. This is highly unlikely, however-of the eleven remands that were
resolved after the one-year frame, but before June 21, 2013, only one was
successful. For examples of cases in which petitioners have succeeded on Lafler
claims, see infra notes 186-88.
146. Johnson v. Uribe, 682 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2012); Titlow v. Burt, 680
F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2012).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Wolfe, 2012 WL 1957427 (E.D. Tenn. May 31,
2012) (motion for a new trial); Commonwealth v. Smigielski, 971 N.E.2d 336
(Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (direct appeal); People v. Douglas, 817 N.W.2d 640 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2012) (direct appeal).
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In sorting through the complicated scenarios that may emerge,
courts should follow the traditional "restorative approach" to
remedies for ineffective assistance. They should try to restore the
defendant to the place he would have occupied but for the ineffective
assistance. To do so, courts should generally order what some have
termed "specific performance" of the foregone plea bargain. The
term specific performance is not entirely accurate-the prosecution's
offer was never accepted, so there is no bargain to enforce. But it is
convenient shorthand for either of two possible responses to
ineffective assistance during plea bargaining: resentencing the
defendant consistent with the initial plea offer or when that is not
possible, ordering the prosecution to reoffer the initial plea bargain
and then resentencing accordingly. 148
The only situation in which such "specific performance"
remedies may not be appropriate is when aggravating facts emerge
independently of the ineffective assistance (in other words, when a
but-for causal link is missing). If courts are faced with aggravating
facts intervening after the plea offer was made, courts should first
examine whether these facts would have influenced the defendant's
sentence in the absence of ineffective assistance. If so, then the
court can properly consider them in resentencing the defendant.
This would be in line with Lafler's holding that certain intervening
circumstances may restrict the remedy to the defendant.
But if the court concludes that counsel's incompetence likely
contributed to the emergence of the aggravating circumstances, then
the court should not take these circumstances into account. This
would be consistent with the restorative approach generally followed
by courts in right-to-counsel cases and would ensure the
effectiveness of remedies for violations of the right to counsel. The
following Subparts explain how this principle would apply in several
concrete scenarios.
A. Scenario 1: Aggravating Facts Emerging Before Approval of the
PleaAgreement by the Court
A court reviewing a Lafler claim may be faced with facts that
aggravate the defendant's culpability and that would have emerged
148. While some commentators have argued that ordering the prosecution to
reoffer the plea bargain is in tension with separation of powers, the Supreme
Court rejected this concern when it held in Lafler that such a remedy is one of
several available to the courts. Compare Perez, supra note 58, at 1551 (arguing
that this remedy would violate separation of powers), with Lafler v. Cooper, 132
S. Ct. 1376, 1389 (2012), and Wolfe, 2012 WL 1957427, at *14 & n.27. Courts
have broad remedial discretion in granting habeas relief. E.g., Hilton v.
Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987).
As Lafler recognized, ordering
prosecutors to reoffer expired or rejected plea deals falls within this discretion.
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389.
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before the plea hearing at which the court typically determines
whether to approve or reject the plea agreement. In Frye, the
defendant committed another crime before the hearing at which the
court would have considered the foregone plea agreement. 149 The
Supreme Court suggested that such an intervening circumstance-a
new crime-would make it very difficult for a defendant to prove
prejudice.1 50 Specifically, the defendant would be unlikely to show
that the prosecution would have stuck by the plea agreement after it
learned of the new crime or, even less likely, that the court would
have accepted the plea agreement in light of the new facts.
Consider the example of a charge bargain presented in federal
court.151 Imagine that before the plea hearing, the prosecutor learns
from a cooperating witness that the defendant played a more central
role in the drug distribution scheme for which he was indicted. In
most cases, the prosecutor would likely withdraw the existing plea
offer; even if the prosecutor did not, the court would likely reject the
charge bargain in light of the newly discovered facts. Regardless of
counsel's competence, in other words, the defendant would not be
able to reap the benefits of the proposed charge bargain. As a
result, the defendant would not be able to show that he was
prejudiced by counsel's incompetence. Intervening circumstances
have broken the chain of causation between the ineffective
assistance and the unfavorable outcome for the defendant.
But in rare cases, a defendant might be able to meet the
prejudice requirement even though new, aggravating facts would
have emerged before the plea acceptance stage. In the charge
bargain case above, the defendant might be able to show that the
new facts were not so significant as to disturb the bargain and that
similarly culpable defendants had comparable charge bargains
accepted by the court. If the charge bargain would have been
accepted by the court, the defendant can show that the reason he
lost the benefit of the bargain is the ineffective assistance of his
counsel. Had his counsel acted competently, the defendant would
have received the charge bargain. Even if the defendant proves
prejudice, however, Lafler allows reviewing courts, at the remedial
stage, to refuse to grant the defendant the full benefit of the charge
bargain based on intervening circumstances that (as the defendant
has proven) would not in fact have derailed the plea bargain. 152

149. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012).
150. Id. at 1410-11.
151. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court may accept a
charge bargain, reject it, or defer its decision until it has reviewed the
presentence report. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A).
152. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389 (noting that, at the remedial stage, judges
may consider "information concerning the crime . .. after the plea offer was
made").
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This approach conflicts with the principle that the defendant
should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for the
ineffective assistance. The defendant's ability to prove prejudice
would seem pointless if the court can reconsider the same
intervening circumstances at the remedial stage and deny relief
then. Reviewing courts should instead vacate the conviction
procured as a result of ineffective assistance and should restore the
bargain that the defendant has proven he would have received but
for his lawyer's incompetence. 153
The same analysis would apply to plea agreements that specify
what sentence would apply to the case.154 If the court accepts such
an agreement, it is bound to follow the sentence negotiated by the
parties.15 5 If aggravating facts arise before the plea hearing, the
defendant would have difficulty proving that ineffective assistance
prejudiced him. In light of the newly discovered facts, the court
would likely have rejected a sentencing agreement negotiated by the
parties.
But if the defendant manages to show prejudice, the intervening
factor should not be counted again for purposes of curtailing the
remedy. If the defendant shows that the court would have accepted
the agreement, then it is only the incompetent representation of his
counsel that deprived him of the agreement's benefits. Under these
circumstances, despite the intervening facts, restoring the defendant
to the position he would have occupied but for the incompetent
representation means sentencing him pursuant to the original
agreement.
In practice, the problem described in this Subpart is not likely
to arise frequently. Most reviewing courts would likely conclude
that if an aggravating fact had emerged before the plea hearing, the
deal would have fallen apart regardless of the competence of the
defendant's lawyer. They would likely find that the prosecution
would have withdrawn the offer or the court would have rejected the
plea agreement. Most reviewing courts would accordingly dismiss
such a case at the prejudice stage and would not even reach the
question of remedy. For the few that do, however, it is important to
develop a coherent approach that does not consider the same
aggravating fact twice to penalize a defendant for the mistakes of
his counsel.

153. As discussed in the following Part, however, the newly emerged
aggravating facts might still be able to be considered by the reviewing court for
sentencing purposes-just not for purposes of denying the defendant the benefit
of the original charge bargain.
154. In federal court, the parties can reach such an agreement under Rule
11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(c)(1)(C).
155. Id.
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Scenario 2: Aggravating Facts Emerging Before Sentencing
A more common scenario is that in which the aggravating facts
would have emerged after the plea hearing but before sentencing.
Imagine the following hypothetical. A defendant proceeds to trial as
a result of his attorney's failure to convey a plea offer and is found
guilty. In preparing a presentencing report ("PSR"), the probation
officer uncovers aggravating facts that had not emerged during the
trial. Assume that the prosecution could show, by preponderance of
the evidence, that the probation officer would have uncovered the
same aggravating facts in preparation of the PSR even if counsel
had been effective and the defendant had entered a guilty plea.
While the aggravating facts discovered by the probation officer
would not have affected the court's decision to accept or reject the
plea bargain, they might still have influenced the ultimate sentence
in cases where the underlying bargain was either a charge bargain
or a nonbinding sentence recommendation. 156 In those cases, the
PSR findings could affect the sentence regardless of the quality of
counsel's representation during plea bargaining.
In these situations, the harsher sentence could not be attributed
to ineffective assistance but merely to the intervening facts. It
would therefore be consistent with the restorative approach to
consider the aggravating facts when determining the remedy for
ineffective assistance.1 57 When placing the defendant in the position
he would have occupied but for ineffective assistance, the court can
still take into account factors that would have emerged
independently of the ineffective assistance.
B.

156. See, e.g., United States v. Pizzolato, 655 F.3d 403, 406 (5th Cir. 2011);
State v. Sanchez, 46 P.3d 774 (Wash. 2002).
157. The defendant bears the burden of establishing reasonable probability
that the court would have accepted the proposed plea agreement, but the
prosecution would bear the burden of establishing that intervening aggravating
facts would have increased the sentence regardless of counsel's effectiveness.
Cf. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1468-69 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting
that the prosecution would have "to demonstrate that intervening
circumstances have so changed the factual premises of its original offer that,
with just cause, it would have modified or withdrawn its offer prior to its
expiration date"); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 47 (3d Cir. 1992)
(determining that when fashioning an appropriate remedy, the court could
consider "any legitimate (nonvindictive) reasons why the prosecution may no
longer favor the plea agreement"). The allocation of the burden of proof here
would be similar to that in "inevitable discovery" cases, where the government
is similarly arguing that it would have uncovered relevant evidence
independently of the constitutional violation that preceded the discovery of the
evidence. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (holding that to establish
an exception to the exclusionary rule, the prosecution must "establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful means").
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This analysis would apply in a similar fashion to plea
agreements that include a sentencing recommendation but leave the
final sentencing decision to the court. In those cases, the court
would typically approve the plea agreement but postpone the
decision whether to accept
the accompanying
sentence
recommendation. 15 8 If the court later learns from the PSR about
facts that make the defendant's culpability seem far more serious, it
is not likely to follow the sentence recommendation. The defendant
can typically expect a more severe sentence reflecting the newly
discovered facts.
In this scenario, once again, competent representation would
not have saved the defendant from receiving the harsher sentence.
A reviewing court deciding the remedy for ineffective assistance
could properly consider the aggravating facts to the extent that
these facts would have been considered by the original sentencing
court. 159
C.

Scenario 3: Aggravating Facts Emerging at Trial
The restorative approach would yield a different result when
the aggravating facts emerge thanks, at least in part, to the
ineffective assistance. This could happen, for example, when new
facts surface during the trial following the foregone plea offer. A
witness might reveal that the defendant in fact smuggled a much
larger quantity of drugs than the prosecution had previously known,
that the defendant acted with malice rather than recklessly, or that
the defendant committed additional, uncharged crimes that could be
considered as relevant conduct at sentencing. The list of damaging
facts that could emerge at trial is endless.
Under Lafler, lower courts may be able to take such facts into
account at the remedial stage. The Court noted that judges are not
required to disregard "information concerning the crime after the
plea offer was made." 160 The Court implied that competing social
interests may lead courts to limit the remedy for ineffective
assistance. An amicus brief for Connecticut and eighteen other

158. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(B).
159. Ebron v. Comm'r of Corr., 53 A.3d 983, 993, 995 (Conn. 2012); cf.
United States v. Allen, 53 F. App'x 367, 376-77 (6th Cir. 2002) (explaining that
where the presentencing report would have recommended a more serious
sentence than that contained in the foregone plea offer, it is likely that the
judge would have followed the presentence report and not the government
recommendation, so defendant could not show he was prejudiced by his
counsel's ineffectiveness).
160. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389 (2012). Commentators have
read this statement by the Court to allow trial courts to consider aggravating
facts revealed at trial. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Lafler, Frye and Our StillUnregulatedPlea BargainingSystem, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 131, 132 (2012).
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states in a case coming to the Supreme Court next term elaborates
on this point.16 1 It contends that courts should be able to consider
facts emerging at trial in order to accommodate the public interest
in a fitting punishment-namely a punishment that serves the goals
of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 1 62
Under this view, the defendant's right to a remedy should be
balanced against the public's interest in a fitting punishment, and
when serious aggravating facts emerge at trial, the balance would
shift in favor of the public interest.
Courts should reject this argument for several reasons. First, it
is peculiar to call for a "fitting punishment" in the context of
remedies for ineffective assistance when our criminal justice system
regularly subverts this principle by allowing plea bargaining. When
prosecutors and courts resolve the vast majority of cases through
plea bargaining, they routinely forfeit the opportunity to uncover all
facts relevant to the defendant's culpability and to impose the most
fitting punishment.163 Invoking this aim only in Lafler-type cases
would not truly restore the proper place of these principles in our
criminal justice system but would instead unfairly punish only those
defendants unlucky enough to have had incompetent counsel.164
More broadly, the approach advocated by the states would be
inconsistent with the fundamental principle that the defendant
should be restored to the position he occupied before the violation of
his rights occurred. But for counsel's incompetence, the defendant
would not have gone to trial and the aggravating facts would not
have been uncovered.165
The court should not decrease the

161. Brief of Amici Curiae Connecticut and 18 Other States in Support of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Burt v. Titlow, No. 12-414, 2012 WL 5424727, at
*12 (Nov. 5, 2012).
162. Id.
163. The Supreme Court itself acknowledged this point in Lafler: "The
expected post-trial sentence is imposed in only a few percent of cases. It is like
the sticker price for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view full
price as the norm and anything less a bargain." Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387

(quoting Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From
Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011)). In
Frye, the Court went even further, suggesting that defendants who go to trial
and lose "receive longer sentences than even Congress or the prosecutor might
think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the books largely for
bargaining purposes." Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (quoting Rachel

Barkow, Separation of Powers and Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034
(2006)); see also Alschuler, supranote 9, at 685-86, 696-704.
164. Cf. Gabriel J. Chin, Federalism and a Fantasy of Full Enforcement:
Justice Scalia on Plea Bargaining,25 FED. SENT'G REP. 135, 136 (2012) (noting
that "[n]o court or legislature has decided that the quality of a defendant's
lawyer is a just reason to impose a higher or lower sentence").
165. The prosecution would still be free to argue, consistent with the
argument in Subpart IV.B, that some of the aggravating facts that emerged at
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defendant's remedy based on evidence emerging as a result of
ineffective assistance, as this would be punishing the defendant for
his counsel's mistakes. Frye and Lafler both held that a fair trial
does riot erase the constitutional injury caused by ineffective
assistance at the plea bargaining stage. Were courts to use fruits of
the trial to deny a remedy for ineffective assistance, the right
announced in Lafler would be little more than a "form of words."166
D.

Scenario 4: The Prosecution'sForegone Benefits
Perhaps the most vexing question arising under Lafler is
whether courts should curtail the defendant's remedy to account for
benefits lost by the prosecution as a result of the plea deal's collapse.
The Supreme Court will consider this question in a case coming
before it this fall, Burt v. Titlow.167 This Subpart argues that courts
may consider the defendant's willingness to cooperate at the stage of
evaluating whether there is prejudice, but once the defendant has
passed this threshold, he should be entitled to reap the benefits of
the bargain, regardless of the benefits foregone by the prosecution.
In making plea offers, the prosecution expects to receive some
consideration from the defendant in exchange for the reduction in
punishment. Most commonly, the prosecution seeks to save time
and resources by avoiding trial.- In many cases, it also hopes to gain
the defendant's cooperation in other prosecutions. Occasionally, the
prosecution may offer a plea deal at least in part to spare vulnerable
victims from testifying. When ineffective assistance prevents the
bargain from coming into being, the prosecution loses these expected
benefits. The U.S. government has therefore argued that courts
should consider this loss to the prosecution in calculating the
appropriate remedy. If courts were simply to restore the defendant,

trial would have been uncovered before sentencing (for example, in a sentencing
report), even if the defendant had taken the plea offer. If the government can
make this showing by a preponderance of the evidence, the court can properly
consider the facts, as they would likely have emerged independently of the
ineffective assistance. See supra Subpart IV.B.
166. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Ebron v. Comm'r of Corr.,
53 A.3d 983, 992 n.9 (Conn. 2012) ("It would have been inconsistent for the
court in Lafler to conclude, on the one hand, that the habeas court can consider
information that never would have come to light if not for counsel's deficient
performance in the interest of fairness while, on the other hand, concluding that
the fact that the petitioner received a fair sentence after a fair trial does not
obviate any prejudice embodied in the petitioner's failure to accept the plea
offer.").
167. 680 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Feb.
25, 2013) (No. 12-414).
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but not the prosecution, to the status quo ante, this would give the
defendant "a substantial quid for essentially no quo."168
The Supreme Court implied in Lafler that habeas courts may
consider the advantages lost by the prosecution as a result of the
ineffective assistance. Courts could refer to the original plea offer as
a "baseline [that] can be consulted" but impose a more severe
sentence to reflect the prosecution's lost benefits. 169 In his dissent,
Justice Alito specifically suggested that courts should not restore
the original plea offer where the rejection of the offer has resulted
"in a substantial expenditure of scarce prosecutorial or judicial
resources." 170
Two chief concerns seem to underlie the position of those who
advocate balancing in this context. First, granting the benefit of a
foregone cooperation agreement would benefit some defendants who
would not in fact have cooperated with the prosecution and would
therefore be receiving an undeserved windfall.171 Second, because
plea bargaining entails a give-and-take from both sides, it would be
unfair to restore fully the benefits of the defendant under the
bargain while leaving the prosecution without redress for its
losses.172
The first concern is adequately addressed by the prejudice
analysis. The defendant must establish a reasonable probability
that he would have accepted the plea bargain.173 When an ordinary
plea agreement is at issue, the defendant must show not simply that
he would have said yes to the offer but also that he would have
performed under it (i.e., that he would have pleaded guilty). By
analogy, if the plea bargain also required cooperation by the
defendant, lower courts should consider not merely whether the
defendant would have agreed to cooperate but whether he would in
fact have cooperated.
Like the rest of the prejudice analysis, this showing will not be
automatic. It is not clear whether courts will accept the defendant's
sworn statement as sufficient to establish the likelihood of
cooperation. The Court may resolve this question in Burt v. Titlow
next term, but it is likely that the defendant would have to provide
some objective evidence-even if circumstantial-to prove the

168. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
9, Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (No. 10-209).
169. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389; Titlow v. Burt, 680 F.3d 577, 592 (6th Cir.
2012) (alteration in original); United States v. Wolfe, No. 2:11-CR-33, 2012 WL
1957427, at *14 (E.D. Tenn. May 31, 2012) (alteration in original).
170. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398-99 (Alito, J., dissenting).
171. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
supra note 168, at 26.
172. Id. at 29.
173. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385.
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likelihood of cooperation. 174 This stringent requirement will ensure
that defendants who would not have cooperated do not receive an
unjustified windfall as a result of the ineffective assistance. In fact,
depending on the Court's interpretation of the evidence required to
support a prejudice showing, many meritorious claims may be left
unrecognized.17 5 In short, concerns about an undeserved windfall
are misplaced in this context. If defendants demonstrate at the
prejudice stage that they would have cooperated but for the
ineffective assistance of their counsel, restoring them to the position
before the constitutional violation requires that they receive the
benefits under the cooperation agreement. A lesser remedy would
underenforce the right to effective counsel.
The other argument that advocates of balancing make is that
plea bargaining presupposes mutuality of advantage, so courts
should not restore benefits of the bargain to the defendant while
leaving the prosecution without redress. If the court cannot revive
the benefits of the bargain for the prosecution, then it would be
unfair to do so only for the defendant. The prosecution would never
have proposed the plea bargain under the same terms if it had
known that the defendant would not have been able to perform some
or all of his obligations under the bargain. 176
This argument, however, confuses the court's duty in Laflertype cases. The court's task is not to enforce the bargain between
the prosecution and the defense but rather to redress the violation of
the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. The prosecution is not
granted rights under the Sixth Amendment and has suffered no
constitutional injury that needs to be remedied. Therefore, the
resentencing court does not need to adjust the remedy to the
defendant (the actual right holder under the Sixth Amendment) in

174. Titlow v. Burt, 680 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W.
3465 (2013) (No. 12-414). Courts may consider any significant sentence and
charge reductions accompanying a cooperation agreement as evidence that the
defendant would have cooperated. See id. at 589-90. Additional objective
evidence could include statements that the defendant made to his attorney (or
to others) before trial about willingness to cooperate; previous cooperation by
the defendant; and whether cooperation would have involved a less onerous
obligation (such as simply providing information about other cases) or more
demanding tasks (such as wearing a wire or testifying against dangerous

defendants). See id.
175. In many Lafler-type cases, the defendant would not have been aware of
the cooperation agreement, so it would be extremely difficult to provide
objective evidence that he would have accepted it and performed under it.
176. Brief of Amici Curiae Connecticut and 18 Other States in Support of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Burt v. Titlow, No. 12-414, 2012 WL 5424727, at
*15-16 (Nov. 5, 2012).
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an effort to return the prosecution more closely to the status quo
ante. 177
The same arguments apply to the prosecution's additional
expenditure of time and resources when a plea bargain falls apart as
a result of ineffective assistance. After foregoing a favorable plea
offer, defendants typically proceed to trial, where the prosecution
devotes significant additional time and effort to the case. Under the
balancing approach advanced in Lafler, courts can consider the
additional expense of resources by the prosecution at trial and
balance the public interest in efficient administration of justice
against the defendant's right to a remedy. This approach, however,
would leave most defendants without a remedy, since in virtually
every Lafler-type case, the prosecution expends additional resources
when a defendant rejects a plea bargain as a result of his counsel's
incompetence. Lafler held that a fair trial does not erase the
constitutional injury caused by ineffective assistance during plea
bargaining; eliminating the remedy to the defendant in order to
compensate the government for the costs of trial would make
Lafler's holding seem hollow. 178 As mentioned before, an approach
focusing on the benefits lost by the prosecution errs further by
seeking to enforce the foregone plea bargain between the parties
instead of focusing on redressing the underlying constitutional
injury.
Remedies for constitutional violations are frequently awarded
long after the violation has occurred, and restoring the defendant to
the status quo ante will often leave the prosecution worse off. When
a court orders a retrial for a defendant who has suffered ineffective
assistance at his first trial, the prosecution will suffer various
disadvantages as a result of the imposition of this relief. The
prosecution would have expended significant resources on the first
trial, whose result was invalidated. And it may have lost the

177. Indeed, the Court has held that the state has a duty to provide
competent counsel and therefore it must also bear the costs of ineffective
assistance and not shift them to the defendant. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 754 (1991). Increasing the defendant's sentence to offset losses to the
prosecution resulting from ineffective assistance would be such an
impermissible shift of costs. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 379 (1986).
See United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[Elven if one
might perceive that the government's competing interests might be infringed by
requiring that the original offer be reinstated, a contrary result would
impermissibly shift the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel from the
government to [the defendant].")

178. See Donald A. Dripps, Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court: The
End of the Beginning?, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 141, 141 n.7 (2012) ("Since every
trial involves 'a substantial expenditure of scarce ... resources,' Justice Alito's
formulation of the remedial inquiry would render the majority's analysis of the
substantive claim nearly, if not entirely, nugatory.").
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cooperation of valuable witnesses for the proceedings on retrial.
Indeed, if the expenditure of additional resources were allowed to
affect remedies in the Sixth Amendment context, it is difficult to
imagine how retrial would ever be an appropriate remedy for
ineffective assistance of counsel. Just as courts refuse to conduct
balancing when ordering retrial for other right to counsel violations,
they should also spurn balancing when ordering remedies under
Lafler.
IV. LOWER COURTS AND REMEDIES AFTER LAFLER

Prior to Lafler, state and federal courts varied in their
approaches to claims of ineffective assistance during plea
bargaining. A small minority of courts refused to recognize that the
defendant had been prejudiced by the ineffective assistance during
plea bargaining when he had later been convicted at a fair trial. 179
This position has been squarely rejected by Lafler. The remaining
courts recognized a right to effective assistance during plea
Some
bargaining but differed in the remedies they awarded.
granted a new trial, 180 others ordered "specific performance," 18 1 and
yet others permitted consideration of intervening circumstances to
influence the remedy.182 "Specific performance" was the most

179. State v. Monroe, 757 So. 2d 895, 898 (La. Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185, 1188 (Utah 2007).
180. E.g., Carmichael v. People, 206 P.3d 800, 809-10 (Colo. 2009); People v.
Curry, 687 N.E.2d 877, 890 (Ill. 1997); Commonwealth v. Copeland, 554 A.2d
54, 61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); In re McCready, 996 P.2d 658, 661 (Wash. Ct. App.
2000); State v. Lentowski, 569 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997); see also
Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487, 500 (7th Cir. 2007) (ordering retrial but
suggesting that in some cases, specific performance may be more appropriate).
See generally Perez, supra note 58, at 1576-77 (arguing that a new trial is the
most appropriate remedy).
181. E.g., United States v. Carmichael, 216 F.3d 224, 227 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that specific performance would be appropriate if the defendant shows
that he would have accepted the offer and the court would have accepted the
guilty plea and sentenced pursuant to it); Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1469; Wanatee v.
Ault, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1214 (N.D. Iowa 2000), affd, 259 F.3d 700 (8th Cir.
2001); State v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 1986); Osborne v.
Commonwealth, 992 S.W.2d 860, 866 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998); Williams v. State,
605 A.2d 103, 110-11 (Md. 1992); Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 542 (Minn.
2007); State v. Taccetta, 797 A.2d 884, 887-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002);
Harris v. State, 875 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Tenn. 1994); Ex parte Lemke, 13 S.W.3d
791, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), overruled by Exparte Argent, 393 S.W.3d 781
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Dew v. State, 843 N.E.2d 556, 571 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006) ("If the state decides not to renew its plea offer, or if the trial court
decides not to accept a guilty plea, then [the defendant] shall be granted a new
trial.").
182. United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 47 (3d Cir. 1992); Davie v. State, 675
S.E.2d 416, 424 (S.C. 2009) ("In re-sentencing Petitioner, the circuit court judge
shall take into consideration the State's prior fifteen-year plea offer. We further
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common remedy, followed by the grant of a new trial. Both
remedies were justified on the grounds that they placed the
defendant in the position he occupied before the ineffective
assistance. The new trial remedy, however, was rejected by Lafler
on the grounds that it was not adequately tailored to repair the
injury suffered by the defendant.183 Defendants in Lafler-type cases
had already received a fair trial, so ordering a new trial would not
help cure the prejudice resulting from the ineffective assistance. 184
Lafler left courts with the option of ordering specific performance, as
most lower courts had previously done, but it also suggested that
courts could provide something less than specific performance when
new facts had intervened.
In the first year following Lafler, lower courts reached the
question of remedy in only fourteen published decisions. Many more
claims were remanded to trial courts for a resolution on the merits
and the remedy.18 5 In light of Lafler, courts now routinely reject
retrial as an appropriate remedy. Instead, they have used their
discretion to resentence or order a reinstatement of the plea offer,
producing a variety of approaches, particularly when aggravating
circumstances or foregone cooperation agreements are at issue.
What is clear from these early decisions is that lower courts are
struggling to interpret and apply the Supreme Court's guidance on
the question of remedies.
Several courts have asserted that the defendant should be
restored to the position he would have occupied in the absence of
ineffective assistance. 186 But they have differed on the implications

direct that any sentence Petitioner receives should not exceed the original
twenty-seven-year sentence."); Becton v. Hun, 516 S.E.2d 762, 768-69 (W. Va.
1999) (holding that trial court should consider prior offer, but is not bound by it,
and may impose any sentence up to the post-trial sentence); see also Magana v.
Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542, 553 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that state can offer a less
favorable plea deal to defendant than the original offer, but to do so, the state
would have to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness which would attach to
the new offer); State v. Donald, 10 P.3d 1193, 1205 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)
("Specifically, we hold that a court, without violating separation of powers, may
order the prosecution to reinstate a plea offer if, after conducting a hearing and
permitting the State to present all relevant considerations, the court finds
reinstatement necessary to remedy a deprivation of effective counsel.").
183. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389 (2012).
184. See, e.g., State v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Iowa 1986) (stating that
"[o]ne more fair trial, or even a series of them," will not restore the "lost chance"
of the plea bargain).
185. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
186. E.g., Johnson v. Uribe, 682 F.3d 1238, 1244 (9th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Polatis, No. 2:10-CR-0364, 2013 WL 1149842, at *12 (D. Utah Mar. 19,
2013); In re Alonzo, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 748, 756-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Ebron v.
Comm'r of Corr., 53 A.3d 983, 996 (Conn. 2012); see also United States v. Wolfe,
No. 2:11-CR-33, 2012 WL 1957427, at *14-15 (E.D. Tenn. May 31, 2012)
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of that principle. Some have simply ordered the government to
reinstate the original plea offer, 187 while others have noted that
intervening circumstances-such as lost benefits to the prosecution
or aggravating information occurring after the plea agreement's
hypothetical acceptance-should be taken into account in fashioning
a remedy.18 8 Courts have not yet articulated clear principles on how
intervening circumstances should affect the remedy.
Two courts have held that on resentencing, the trial court may
consider the benefits that the prosecution lost as a result of the
ineffective assistance and increase the defendant's sentence
accordingly. 189 One court has suggested that in calculating the
remedy, the trial court may consider "the defendant's willingness to
accept responsibility for his actions"-seemingly reconsidering a fact
that would already have been considered at the prejudice stage. 190
Courts have also said that the remedy may depend on "information
concerning the crime that was discovered after the plea offer was
made," without specifying whether a causal link between the
ineffective assistance and the newly emerged information would
have any significance.191

(suggesting that the remedy should attempt to restore both the defendant and
the prosecution to the positions they occupied prior to the rejection of the plea
offer).
187. E.g., Jones v. United States, 504 F. App'x 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2012);
Polatis, 2013 WL 1149842, at *12; Soto-Lopez v. United States, Nos. 07-cr-3475IEG, 10-cv-1852-IEG, 2012 WL 3134253, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2012); Alonzo,
147 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 756-57; People v. Douglas, 817 N.W.2d 640, 653-54 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2012); see also People v. Phillips, C067261, 2012 WL 3089359, at *4
(Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2012) (remanding for evidentiary hearing, but concluding
that if court finds ineffective assistance, proper remedy would be to order the
prosecution to reinstate the original plea offer).
188. Titlow v. Burt, 680 F.3d 577, 592-93 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Love, No. 10 C 50285, 2012 WL 2921496, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2012); Wolfe,
2012 WL 1957427, at *14-15; Ebron, 53 A.3d at 995; People v. McCauley, 821
N.W.2d 569, 569 (Mich. 2012); State v. Gordon, No. A-2540-10T2, 2012 WL
2890623, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 17, 2012).
189. Titlow, 680 F.3d at 592-93; Wolfe, 2012 WL 1957427, at *14. Both
Wolfe and Titlow suggested that in fashioning a remedy trial courts should
consider the original plea agreement as a baseline but adjust the sentence to
account for competing interests, including the prosecution's loss of cooperation
benefits. In Wolfe, the prosecution had "potentially lost a major benefit of the
bargain it sought with the defendant, that is, his cooperation in an effort to
identify and prosecute the California marijuana supplier." Wolfe, 2012 WL
1957427, at *14. In Titlow, the prosecution lost the ability to use Titlow's
testimony at the murder trial of her aunt, and the aunt was subsequently
acquitted. The prosecution therefore "lost the major benefit that it sought from
the initial plea agreement." Titlow, 680 F.3d at 592.
190. McCauley, 821 N.W.2d at 569.

191. Id.
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So far, only the Connecticut Supreme Court appears to have
considered the causal link between the ineffective assistance and
subsequently emerging aggravating facts. Consistent with the
approach advocated in this Article, the court held that information
that was uncovered at trial (as a result, at least in part, of the
ineffective assistance) should not be used to increase the defendant's
sentence. 192 The same court also concluded-again consistent with
the restorative approach-that the trial court could nonetheless
consider "any information concerning the crime or the petitioner
that would have come to light between the acceptance of the plea
offer and the imposition of the sentence." 193
CONCLUSION

The confusion among the lower courts suggests that the
Supreme Court should provide more concrete guidance concerning
what relief defendants must receive. The Court can do so by
clarifying that an ad hoc balancing of interests is not appropriate in
determining remedies for ineffective assistance. The Court should
instead instruct trial courts to use the "restorative approach" that
has long applied to remedies in right to counsel cases. Under this
approach, courts should generally attempt to restore the defendant
to the place he occupied before ineffective assistance. Reading
Lafler narrowly, they should consider new facts only when these
facts would have emerged independently of the ineffective
assistance. Finally, courts should recognize that when a defendant
foregoes a plea bargain as a result of his counsel's incompetence, the
prosecution has not suffered a constitutional injury that demands
redress.
If the Court fails to provide such guidance in Burt v. Titlow,
lower courts should take it upon themselves to devise remedies that
adequately vindicate the defendant's right to effective assistance. 194
A number of federal and state jurisdictions have already used the
restorative approach proposed here to remedy ineffective assistance
during plea bargaining. This has proven manageable and practical.
With further refinement, it should become increasingly coherent and

192. Ebron, 53 A.3d at 992 n.9.
193. Id. at 993.
194. State courts can always choose to provide more generous remedies
under state law. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 268 (2008) (quoting Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 178-79 (1990)) (holding that
federal law simply "sets certain minimum requirements that States must meet
but may exceed in providing appropriate relief"). Moreover, Lafler left bountiful
discretion to both state and federal courts in fashioning remedies for ineffective
assistance of plea bargaining. This discretion includes providing remedies that
restore defendants to the position they would have occupied in the absence of
the constitutional violation.
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predictable. Restoring the benefits foregone as a result of ineffective
assistance will help ensure that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is not reduced to a mere "form of words."195

195.

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).

